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192Control of an Outbreak of Human Parainfluenza Virus 3
in Hematopoietic Stem Cell Transplant Recipients
Richard T. Maziarz,1 Praseeda Sridharan,1 Susan Slater,1 Gabrielle Meyers,1 Mary Post,1
Dean D. Erdman,2 Teresa C.-T. Peret,2 Randy A. Taplitz3Human parainfluenza virus 3 (HPIV3) infection can cause significant morbidity and mortality in patients
undergoing hematopoietic stem cell transplantation (HSCT). There are no standard guidelines for the
prevention and control of HPIV3 in the outpatient setting. After 2 HSCT inpatients diagnosed with HPIV3
were noted to have had multiple recent HSCToutpatient clinic (OPC) visits, an investigation of policy and
procedures in the HSCT OPC was undertaken, and active surveillance for respiratory viral illness was
instituted in the at-risk HSCT population. Between July 19 and August 30, 2005, 13 patients were diagnosed
with HPIV3 infection. Morbidity in affected patients was significant, and mortality was high (38.5%) and not
affected by antiviral therapy. Molecular typing identified several genetically distinct groups of the hemagglu-
tinin-neuraminidase gene of the 11 available isolates. Based on sequence relatedness among the isolates and
the demographic and exposure history of the patients, in many of these cases HPIV3 infection likely was
acquired in the HSCT OPC. The major infection control interventions were introduced between August
20 and August 24. An epidemic curve revealed that HPIV3 infection frequency peaked between August 17
and August 26, with no cases identified after August 30. Prompt attention and focus on infection control
interventions were associated with a rapid decrease in the number of incident cases. Policies and procedures
regarding patients with respiratory viral illnesses in HSCT OPC populations should be formulated and
universally reinforced with HSCT clinic staff to prevent the spread of these infections.
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Community-acquired respiratory viral infections
are a significant cause of morbidity and mortality in
patients undergoing hematopoietic stem cell transplan-
tation (HSCT). Human parainfluenza virus 3 (HPIV3)
has been associated with significant mortality, particu-
larly when lower respiratory tract infections are identi-
fied [1]. In large transplantation centers, an incidence
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6/j.bbmt.2009.09.014mented in patients undergoing HSCT [1-3]. HPIV-
induced pneumonia has a mortality of 40%-50% in
adultHSCTpatients, and the infecting virus is predom-
inantly type 3 [4].
Despite multiple reports detailing the infection
control implications, morbidity, and mortality associ-
ated with HPIV3 infections in HSCT recipients, there
are no consensus guidelines on the prevention and
management of these highly contagious respiratory
virus infections in severely immunocompromised
hosts. Infection control strategies aimed at preventing
virus acquisition are especially important given that
HSCT recipients with HPIV3 infection may experi-
ence prolonged (up to 4 months) [4,5] or asymptom-
atic viral shedding [6]. Although ribavirin has been
shown to be active against HPIV in vitro and in vivo,
no controlled clinical trial (CCT) has established its ef-
ficacy in human HPIV disease [7-11]. For this reason,
prevention of virus acquisition and transmission re-
mains paramount.
Here, we describe an outbreak of 13 cases of
HPIV3 infection in HSCT recipients over a 2-month
period and the strict enforcement of the infection
Biol Blood Marrow Transplant 16:192-198, 2010 193Parainfluenza Virus 3 in Stem Cell Transplantationcontrol procedures that were associated with contain-
ment of the infection.METHODS
Patients and Setting
The Oregon Health & Science University in Port-
land is a large referral center for patients with hemato-
logic malignancies that performs more than 120 adult
allogeneic and autologous HSCTs annually. HSCT re-
cipients treated in the inpatient setting are admitted to 1
of3different transplantationor oncologywards.All staff
and visitors in these units are asked to adhere to strict
hand hygiene procedures on entering the ward. All pa-
tients treated in theoutpatient settingsare seen ina clinic
located in another building, across the street from the
hospital. The layout of theOPC consists of a large wait-
ing room, from which patients are directed to either
a large open infusion center roomor to1of 10 individual
exam rooms. Before the study intervention, the patients
were reminded by signs to practice hand hygiene, cover
the mouth when coughing, and don a mask for respira-
tory viral symptoms; however, no organized, ongoing
assessment of compliancewith this practicewas in place.
Droplet precautions practiced in the outpatient setting
before the investigation were usually limited to the pa-
tientswhohadobvious respiratory tract infections.Con-
tact isolation was usually limited to patients colonized
with vancomycin-resistant enterococcus. Routine nasal
swabs or washings for respiratory viral screening were
not performed in patients with symptomatic respiratory
illnesses before implementation of the intervention.Definitions
Upper respiratory tract infection (URTI) was de-
fined as the presence of coryza, pharyngitis, sinusitis,
and/or cough with or without fever and a clear chest
radiograph. Lower respiratory tract infection (LRTI)
was defined as the presence of wheezing, hypoxia, or
pneumonia with a new chest radiographic opacity or
low oxygen saturation.
Institutional policy for ill OHSU employees with
patient contact (ill-provider policy) includes exclusion
from duties including any contact with patients for 5
days after onset of respiratory symptoms. Compliance
with this policy is not strictly monitored, however.
For patients in contact isolation, all health care
providers and family members were required to don
a gown and gloves before entering the room. For
patients in rooms with droplet precautions in place,
all health care providers and family members in close
contact with the patient were required to wear a mask.Isolation Procedures
In the 2 HSCT inpatients diagnosed with HPIV3
infection by bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL), a review
of their recent outpatient history revealed multiple
OPC visits in the preceding weeks. Based on this ob-
servation, the following policies and procedures were
empirically undertaken in an attempt to assess the
prevalence of HPIV3 in the HSCT OPC and to pre-
vent further potential spread of the disease:
1. All adult patients in the bone marrow transplanta-
tion (BMT) center between early August and Sep-
tember 30, who had signs and symptoms of URTI
or LRTI in the outpatient setting, underwent de-
tailed clinical evaluation, and samples were ac-
quired from URT or LRT washings. Patients
with LRTI with new pulmonary abnormalities on
computed tomography scan underwent BAL.
2. In the OPC, patients and family members were
asked to wash their hands and were screened for
acute respiratory illness on entry to the OPC (see
3). Symptomatic patients were immediately masked
and placed in a private roomwith contact and drop-
let precautions, and a respiratory viral screening
sample was obtained. Symptomatic familymembers
were asked to remain in an area of the waiting room
separate from the patients.
3. Detailed guidelines and scripts for phone and clinic
triage were created for use by staff to question all
patients, whether presenting by phone or in the
clinic. Respiratory transmission information signs
requesting that all patients, family members, and
friends with respiratory symptoms should practice
hand hygiene and don a mask immediately were
posted just outside the clinic door, inside all outpa-
tient units, and in the HSCT inpatient units.
4. Staff involved in patient care in the outpatient and
inpatient settings were questioned about recent
URTI or LRTI symptoms and signs. Adherence
to the institutional ill-provider policy was made
mandatory if any signs of URTI or LRTI were eli-
cited.
5. Visitation by symptomatic family members was
prohibited.
6. The decision whether to admit patients and treat-
ment decisions were made by the HSCT provider
team in consultation with the Infectious Diseases
service.
7. Patients with documented HPIV3 were asked to
adhere to strict hand hygiene policy, wear a mask
for 1 month after active infection during all OPC
visits, and were placed in private rooms for the
same duration.
In the inpatient setting, in addition to the fore-
going precautions, the following procedures were
instituted:
194 Biol Blood Marrow Transplant 16:192-198, 2010R. T. Maziarz et al.1. HSCT inpatients with respiratory illness were
isolated and screening respiratory viral samples
obtained.
2. Family visitation was limited.Virology Procedures
Nasopharyngeal washings obtained from all
HSCT recipients with URTI symptoms and BAL for
those with LRTI were submitted for viral testing. Shell
vial cultures were performed on all specimens sent for
viral testing. The shell vial cultures were screened at 24
hours using a pool of monoclonal antibodies (mAbs) to
a panel of respiratory viruses (Diagnostic HYBRIDS,
Athens, OH), including HPIV1-3, adenovirus, influ-
enza A and B, and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV).
If positive, the specimens were stained with the indi-
vidual mAbs to identify the virus. If negative at 24
hours, the shell vial cultures were screened again at
48 hours.
The 11 HPIV3 isolates obtained during the
outbreak period were sent blinded to the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for molecular
typing. Reverse- transcription polymerase chain reac-
tion (RT-PCR) and sequencing of nucleotides 1-424
of a variable regionof thehemagglutinin-neuraminidase
(HN) gene was performed as described previously [12].
Selected isolates were resequenced from new RNA
extracts to confirm results. Nucleotide alignments
were compiled using the Pileup program, Wisconsin
package, version 11.1.2 forUNIX (Accelrys, SanDiego,
CA), and phylogenetic analysis was performed by max-
imum likelihood using PAUP* version 4.10 (Sinauer
Associates, Sunderland, MA) [13].Treatment of LRTI
Some patients with LRTI secondary to HPIV3
were treated with ribavirin (1-Beta-D-ribofuranosyl-
1H-1, 2, 4-triazole-3-carboxamide). Ribavirin was
administered by endotracheal tube for 18-24 hours/
day as a continuous aerosol or i.v. The dosage for aero-
solized ribavirin was 6 g/day for 5 days; for i.v. ribavi-
rin, an initial loading dose of 33 mg/kg body weight
was followed by 16 mg/kg every 6 hours for 4 days,
then 8 mg/kg 3 times a day for an additional 3 days.RESULTS
Identification and Demographic Data of Cases
Between July 21, 2005, and August 30, 2005, 13
HSCT recipients were diagnosed with HPIV3 infec-
tion. Of these 13 cases, 5 (38.5%) were inpatients
and 8 (61.5%) were outpatients at diagnosis. Table 1
sumarizes patient characteristics.Molecular Analysis
Molecular typing of the HN gene of the 11 avail-
able isolates identified at least 3 genetically distinct
groups (Figure 1). One group contained a single iso-
late obtained from the first recognized case (patient
1), who was transferred to the inpatient service
from an outside facility 200 miles away; a second
group contained 6 isolates with identical sequences
(patients 2, 4-7, and 11); and a third group contained
4 isolates, 2 with identical sequences (patients 3 and
9) and 2 with unique sequences, differing from all
others by 1 or 2 nucleotide substitutions. Isolates
from 2 patients were unavailable because the patients
were diagnosed at an outside facility and transferred
to OHSU late in their course.
Exposure Analysis
The first case of HPIV3 infection was diagnosed
on June 21, 2005. This patient was transferred from
outside hospital for respiratory distress. BAL per-
formed on the next day tested positive for HPIV3.
The second case was identified 1 month later, on
July 20, 2007, in the inpatient HSCT unit. Between
August 1 and August 20, 2007, 7 more cases were iden-
tified, and the enhanced infection control policies were
enforced starting on August 20.
Clinic visit charts and inpatient hospital room
assignments were reviewed. Inpatient nosocomial
transmission was not suspected in the majority of
cases, based on the (1) lack of inpatient physical prox-
imity, (2) prevalence of diagnosis in the outpatient set-
ting, and (3) admission to the hospital after
identification of established respiratory disease. Of
the 11 cases in whinch HPIV molecular typing was
performed, 10 patients had at least one potential
shared exposure during a common clinic day in the
preceding month with another infected patient, and
most shared multiple clinical visits. A review in the
context of the molecular analysis determined that the
5 patients with group 2 virus had 1-3 common clinic
days with others in the group (June 14 and July 20,
22, 25, and 27). Of the 4 patients with group 3 viruses,
2 were seen on July 20 and 3 were seen on August 16.
Questionnaires given to clinic staff did not elicit
any personal acknowledgment of respiratory signs
and symptoms while at work during the outbreak pe-
riod. However, multiple staff members did note that
before the intervention period, several unmasked
symptomatic patients and family members had been
cared for in the open care area of the OPC.
Infection Control Interventions
The major infection control interventions were in-
troduced between August 20 and August 24. An epi-
demic curve revealed that HPIV3 infection frequency
peaked between August 2 and August 26 (Figure 2).
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Patient 10
Patient 8
Patient 2
Patient 4
Patient 5
Patient 6
Patient 7
Patient 11
Patient 1
Wash/47885/57
0.01 nt/site
Group 2
100%
Group 3
100%
Patient 3
Patient 9
Group 1
Figure 1. Maximum likelihood tree obtained from the nucleotide align-
ment of HPIV3 HN gene sequences (nt 1-424) from 11 patients. Three
major clades are highlighted. Prototype strain Washington/47885/57 is
included as an outgroup. Bootstrap values are indicated for selected
nodes.
196 Biol Blood Marrow Transplant 16:192-198, 2010R. T. Maziarz et al.The final 4HPIV3 cases were diagnosed on August 24,
26, and 30. Screening nasal washes were performed on
symptomatic patients in the OPC until December, and
no HPIV3 infection was identified after August 30.Patient Outcomes
The overall mortality of patients diagnosed with
HPIV3 was 38.5% (5/13). All of the patients who
died had signs of LRTI, and 4 had been treated with
inhaled ribavirin.DISCUSSION
The spectrum of HPIV3 disease in HSCT recipi-
ents ranges from uncomplicated URTIs, characterized
by rhinorrhea, pharyngitis, and coryza, to more severe
LRTIs that may lead to pneumonia, respiratory fail-
ure, and death. The epidemiology of HPIV3 infection
after HSCT is different from that associated with
latent endogenous viral infections, such as
cytomegalovirus (CMV) infections, in which the pa-
tient’s serologic status and degree of immunosuppres-
sion play major roles in disease occurrence [13]. A
retrospective analysis of cases has shown a correlation
of HPIV3 infection with the type of transplantationand the degree of immunosuppression [2]; however,
the majority of cases of HPIV3 still are linked primar-
ily to patient exposure to the virus, with these other
factors likely contributing to individual patient suscep-
tibility.
Viral transmission occurs by direct inoculation of
contagious secretions from hands or of large particle
aerosols into the eyes, nose, or, rarely, the mouth.
The prolonged survival of HPIV3 on the skin, clothes,
or other objects emphasizes the importance of fomites
in the spread of nosocomial virus and of the critical
importance of handwashing in controlling infection
transmission [1,2,13-14].
In immunocompetent adults, this infection rarely
causes significant morbidity or mortality. However,
in HSCT recipients with established pneumonia, the
mortality rate is very high, and no currently established
treatment regimens have been shown to reduce it
[1,15-17]. Because this disease is highly transmissible
and is associated with significant morbidity, prevent-
ing exposure in this vulnerable population may be
the most critical intervention to pursue. Aggressive in-
fection control measures play a key role in preventing
HPIV3 infections and their sequelae in these compro-
mised hosts. This may be complicated by the fact that
viral shedding may be either asymptomatic or pro-
longed [4-6]. Although there are guidelines regarding
prevention of RSV and influenza, most practices con-
cerning HPIV3 are based on data extrapolated from
these other studies [14]. Consensus guidelines on pre-
vention and management strategies for HPIV3 infec-
tions in severely immunocompromised patients are
lacking.
In our cluster of 13 patients with laboratory-
confirmed HPIV3 infection, the geographic proxim-
ity and molecular typing of the virus suggests that
in many of the patients, virus acquisition likely was
nosocomial and took place in the shared, open outpa-
tient infusion area and clinic. Evaluation of the clinic
environment and questionnaires to staff supported
the plausibility of this finding. Before the outbreak,
a number of patients and family members with UR-
TIs had been present in the common area of the
OPC infusion center, in close proximity to other pa-
tients without any isolation precautions. Active infec-
tion control interventions oriented toward strict
limitation of patient-to-patient contact were associ-
ated with control of viral spread in a relatively short
period.
Although the epidemic curve suggests control after
intervention, it could be argued that the decrease in in-
cident cases represented the natural progression and
outcome of the disease as demonstrated by CDC’s
National Respiratory and Enteric Virus Surveillance
System (NREVSS) regional HPIV3 surveillance data.
However, studies fromtheFredHutchinsonCancerRe-
search Center have shown that unlike in community
NREVSS HPIV3 Trends, Seattle, WA
by Week, July 2004 - June 2006
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Biol Blood Marrow Transplant 16:192-198, 2010 197Parainfluenza Virus 3 in Stem Cell TransplantationHPIV3 activity, outbreaks in immunocompromised
hosts do not typically follow a seasonal pattern, and
that nosocomial spread can be multiseasonal, as well as
rapid and prolonged [18-23]. Thus, it seems likely that
control measures introduced in the outpatient HSCT
clinic played some role in curtailing the epidemic.
The outcome of patients in this nonrandomized
study is noteworthy. As detailed in Table 1, 4 patients
with URTI were not treated and recovered. Eight pa-
tients presented with established LRTI; of these, 4
were treated with ribavirin and died, and 1 was treated
with ribavirin and recovered. Of the 3 patients with
LRTI who were not treated with ribavirin, 1 died
and 2 recovered. Finally, 1 patient was treated with ri-
bavirin very early in the course of probable LRTI and
recovered. Although not controlled, these data suggest
no benefit to aerosolized ribavirin in treatment of pa-
tients with established LRTI and accentuate the criti-
cal need for interventions to prevent transmission and
better therapeutic modalities. Well-designed clinical
trials exploring this complicated area would be useful
to help guide interventions, but this is likely unfeasible
because of the relative infrequency of these events.
Thus, we conclude that the development and adher-
ence of strict isolation policies for patients, family
members, and care providers with active respiratory
infections may be the best available intervention.
In summary, 13 patients with HPIV3 infection
associated with significant morbidity and mortalitywere identified in the HSCT population at our aca-
demic medical institution over a several months. Based
on genetic relatedness as well as demographic and ex-
posure history, in the majority of these cases acquisi-
tion of HPIV3 likely occurred in the HSCT OPC.
Prompt attention and focus on infection control inter-
ventions was associated with a rapid decrease in the
number of incident cases. Policies and procedures ad-
dressing the approach to patients with respiratory viral
illnesses in HSCTOPC populations should be formu-
lated and reinforced with clinic staff to help prevent
the spread of these infections. Given the possibility
of asymptomatic or prolonged viral shedding of
HPIV3, the paucity of documented effective treatment
strategies, the high mortality, and the emergence of
newly identified viral respiratory pathogens (eg, boca-
virus, coronaviruses), such infection prevention poli-
cies should emphasize high vigilance and strict
respiratory etiquette throughout the year. A larger
prospective control study would be useful to better
clarify the role of infection control practices for
HPIV3 infection in HSCT recipients.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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